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False Efficiency and Missed Opportunities in
Law and Economics
Shawn J. Bayern*
7his Article points out a simple flaw common to many law-and-conomics analyses,
ngmg frnm fundamental models like the Hand Formula to narrwer arguments like those that
oppose the doctrie ofunconscionability
The flaw is straghtforwar: economic analyses oflaw often assume, either knplcitly or
explicitly that when it is more efficient for an activity to occur than for it not to occur it is
efficient for legal rules to encourage the activity Even on grounds of efficiency alone, however
knowing in isolation whether an activity poduces more wealth than its absence is isufficient to
conclude that the activity is efficient The determiation of efficient legal rules requires an
answer to a further question too oflen neglected by legal economists: what are the activity&
alternatives? Even if an activity is more efficient than its absence, it may poduce less wealth
(perhaps significantly less wealth) than its alternatives, once its harms are taken into account
Encouraging all activities that appear to produce wealth on their own runs the nsk of
encounigmg opportunistic behavior whose effect is more to transfer wealth than to crate it
As a simple example, a legal regime that followed the Hand Formula would encourage
businesses to earn $100,000 by causing $95,000 worth of unavoidable harms to others; that
incentive alone, while probably objectionable for other reasons, is not mefficient because,
bistrumentally spealking, the $100,000 social gains justify the $95,000 social losses. But a rule
based on the Hand Formula would also encourage economic actors to engage in that $100,000-
earning activity rather than one that paid $90,000 but caused no harms; that incentive is
inefficient.
Some economic analyses acknowledge related points, but the law-and-economics
movement hisufficiently understands the flaw that thisAticle describes. Similarly cntics ofthe
law-and-economics movement-while aware of other fundamental flaws in legal-economic
analysis, such as the inapplicability of the rational-actor model in many chrumstances-do not
radiy enough engage economic models on their own terms. ThisArticle attempts to remedy
those oversights, and in doing so, it suggests greater caution in applymg economic reasoning to
law
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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the prominence of law-and-economics arguments in
subjects like tort law and contract law,' many courts and commentators
retain serious doubts about the arguments' application, particularly
where economic reasoning purports to dictate specific legal rules
rather than simply to shed light on the general analysis of law.2 These
doubts are justified for at least two broad reasons. First, economic
goals do not exhaust the law's function; for example, reasons of
fairness and autonomy, not just those of efficiency and wealth
1. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law Afler Three
Decades: Success or Failure, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 829 (2003) ("[E]conomic analysis of
contract law . . . , many scholars would agree, has become the dominant academic style of
contract theory."); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts,
51 VAND. L. REv 1, 4 (1998) (referring to "law and economics" as one of the two "most
prominent theoretical approaches to tort law").
2. See, eg., Posner, supra note 1, at 830 (discussing "the failures of economic
models to explain contract law or to justify reform"); Richard W. Wright, Hand Posner and
the Myth ofthe "Hand Formula, "4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIEs L. 145 (2003) (showing that even
Richard Posner, though an academic proponent of the Hand Formula, has not applied it
consistently as a judge).
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production, can justify legal rules.? Second, economic models do not
always make the right predictions about how real humans, rather than
hypothetical rational actors, respond to incentives; these concerns have
given rise to a critique of the classical law-and-economics movement
known as "behavioral law and economics," which seeks to apply
economic tools with the recognition that people are not perfectly
rational.
The purpose of this Article is to highlight a third kind of doubt
about the effectiveness of determining legal rules through economic
modeling.! Specifically, the Article is motivated by a concern that
there are serious internal flaws in prominent, orthodox legal-economic
arguments. Too rarely do legal commentators challenge the details of
standard economic arguments or test their theoretical and institutional
applicability, even though a potential strength of legal scholarship is to
merge an understanding of facts, context, and institutional
considerations with theories and methodologies of external disciplines,
like economics. This Article aims, in a small way, to help advance that
mode of reasoning.
Though this Article engages economic arguments on their own
terms, it is important to say that my goal is not to elevate economic or
instrumental goals above all others. My argument here is not that
efficiency is always paramount and that economic arguments are
3. See genemlly MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 14-
26 (1988) (describing the "moral norms" that, in addition to propositions about efficiency
and other matters, may serve as the basis of legitimate legal arguments).
4. See, e g., Christine Jolls et al., A BehavioralApproach to Law and Economics, 50
STAN. L. REv. 1471 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral
Science: Removing the RationalityAssumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV.
1051 (2000).
5. My claim is not that this kind of doubt is new; indeed, my previous work has
aimed to highlight other concerns of this form. See Shawn J. Bayern, The Limits of Formal
Economics in Tort Law: The Puzzle of Negligence, 75 BROOK. L. REv 707, 745 (2010)
[hereinafter Bayern, Negligence] (calling for "a kind of economic analysis that has not yet
been done" in analyzing activity levels in tort law); Shawn J. Bayern, Rational Ignorance,
Rational Closed-Mindedness, and Modern Economic Formalism in Contract Law, 97 CALIF.
L. REv 943 (2009) (critiquing on instrumental terms a leading economic argument for
contract formalism). My point in the text, at this stage, is only that internal critiques-
critiques of prominent economic arguments on broader economic terms-are not sufficiently
prominent in legal scholarship.
Others have recently made similar calls, though somewhat more general than mine, for
broader economic reasoning than the dominant arguments provide. Cf Scott Hershovitz,
Hary Potter and the Trouble with Tort Theory, 63 STAN. L. RE. 67, 78 (2010) ("[W]e must
approach every assertion economists make about the efficiency of tort doctrine with a healthy
skepticism .... I cannot demonstrate that any particular bit of received wisdom about the
efficiency of tort doctrine is wrong, much less that all or even most of it is. Instead, what I
can offer are possibility proofs that the standard economic analysis might be wrong. . . .").
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sufficient to determine rules of law; it is that even if economic
considerations were paramount, many prevailing arguments offered by
law-and-economics scholars would still be insufficient to justify their
conclusions about legal policy. Similarly, I take no particular issue in
this Article with the goals of the behavioral economists or with other
attacks on the formal economists' rational-actor models; critiques of
the rational-actor model are often valid and important. My goal is
simply to describe another salient flaw in the applicability of economic
reasoning to law.
My argument proceeds in several stages. First, Part II identifies
the general pattern of the flaw from which I believe many prominent
legal-economic arguments suffer. It also shows how the problem is
related to extremely strong assumptions that the law-and-economics
movement needs to make, even in the context of private law, about the
overall economic perfection of capital markets, credit markets, and
other factor markets-assumptions that ought to be obviously
implausible given the economic events of the last few years. Part III
details this flaw in several foundational arguments prominent in tort
law and contract law-particularly, the Hand Formula and the theory
of efficient breach; it also compares this Article's central critique with
"activity-levels" arguments in tort law. Part IV shows how the flaw
extends further to more particular arguments in those disciplines and
suggests the generality of the flaw. Part V concludes.
II. THE DIsTINCTION BETWEEN OPTIMAL ACTIVITY AND
ACTIVITY THAT IS BETTER THAN ITS ABSENCE
The general problem with much of the economic reasoning that
this Article highlights is easy to state, but the problem raises a number
of subtle issues that need careful exposition. The basic problem is that
"efficiency" has multiple meanings, and it is easy to slide between
them.
Consider, as an example, the following argument: (1) banking
creates wealth; that is, it is socially productive;' (2) therefore, on
6. Of course, the global economy of the last few years has put this proposition into
some doubt. See SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET
TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN (2010) (chronicling the financial crisis of
the last several years); see also The Cost ofRepair, ECONOMisT, Oct. 9, 2010, at 14, 17 ("Paul
Volcker, a former Fed chairman, has caustically called the ATM cash dispenser the only
worthwhile financial innovation of recent decades, a sentiment widely shared by venture
capitalists and non-financial businesses."). But the extent to which it is in fact true is not
relevant to the argument's use as an example.
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grounds of efficiency, we ought to encourage college students to
become bankers.
Of course, this argument needs a few modifications before it can
even get off the ground. For one thing, we might not want to
encourage college students to become bankers if the administrative
costs of doing so were substantial. If it cost billions of dollars to wage
a marketing campaign to encourage college students to become
bankers, it would be inefficient to do so if the expected gains from
encouraging more people to become bankers were more modest.
Similarly, the argument assumes that encouraging college students to
become bankers will increase the likelihood that they will in fact
become bankers-rather than, say, increasing the chances that they
will rebel against a heavy-handed advertising campaign and adopt a
countercultural career path, becoming instead second-rate musicians
who write songs about the evils of banking.
But there is a further flaw in the argument, and that flaw is the
one with which I am concerned: encouraging someone to become a
full-time banker necessarily discourages him or her from pursuing
other full-time work. Even assuming that modem banking is a
productive activity, other activities might be more productive.
Accordingly, it would be a mistake-even on grounds of efficiency
alone-to say that just because something is wealth-producing, or
"socially productive" in the narrow sense that the argument has in
mind, it should be encouraged.'
In other words, the conclusion of the hypothetical argument we
are considering is not just that students should become bankers; it is
that students should become bankers mustead of choosing some
7. President Obama appears to have been motivated by this recognition when, in an
interview on The TonightShowin early 2009, he said:
[W]hat we need is steady growth; we need young people, instead of-a smart kid
coming out of school, instead of wanting to be an investment banker, we need them
to decide they want to be an engineer, they want to be a scientist, they want to be a
doctor or a teacher. And if we're rewarding those kinds of things that actually
contribute to making things and making people's lives better, that's going to put our
economy on solid footing. We won't have this kind of bubble-and-bust economy
that we've gotten so caught up in for the last several years.
Interview of the Pesident by Jay Leno on The Tonight Show (Mar. 19, 2009), http://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/Interview-President-Jay-Leno-Tonight-Show-3-19-09.
8. Of course, we could define the terms "productive" or "wealth-producing" in ways
that are absolute rather than relative-that is, we could choose not to describe banking as
"productive" unless it were the mostproductive possible career for whatever person or people
are in question. But my point is that in much legal-economic analysis, the terms are used




alternative career. When the argument is put that way, its
incompleteness is clear because the opportunity costs of encouraging
people to become bankers are highlighted: those we are encouraging
to become bankers might have become scientists, law professors,
professional athletes, successful humorists, unsuccessful humorists, or
any number of other types of professionals (or nonprofessionals) who
might produce, or destroy, more or less wealth than bankers.
The same considerations apply, with perhaps surprising
regularity, to many kinds of law-and-economics arguments. The
general problem is that an activity may be "efficient," "productive," or
"wealth-producing" in the narrow sense that it is better for it to occur
than for it not to occur. Thus, for example, we might be asked whether
it is efficient for a railroad to run (versus not to run) given the social
value of the transportation it provides and the likelihood it will crash
and cause injuries to passengers. In analyzing the efficiency of a
railroad, we do not need to stop with those particular costs and
benefits; indeed, we might, and often do,' consider a multitude of
others: the harms that arise from the pollution caused by its engine;
the indirect effects on the price of goods and the market for
employment resulting from a more effective system of transport; the
likelihood that sparks from the train will cause fires that affect nearby
agricultural fields; o the effects on nearby residences of noise from the
train; and so on. Even so, the analysis would necessarily be
incomplete unless it incorporates one further consideration, too often
neglected in these sorts of discussions: the activities prevented when
capital, credit, labor, and other economic "production factors" are used
to build and manage a railroad rather than to engage in entirely
unrelated activities (such as organizing and operating sports teams, law
schools, science labs, and so forth).
Suppose we try to analyze the efficiency of the railroad from the
perspective of tort law's Hand Formula, which would determine that
the railroad is efficient if its costs outweigh its benefits." That is, a
standard conclusion of law and economics is that if the railroad's
operation generates $100,000 in social benefits (often manifested
9. Eg., Bayern, Neghgence, supra note 5, at 712-13; see also Robert Cooter & Ariel
Porat, Does Risk to Oneself Increase the Cae Owed to Othefs? Law and Economics n
Conflict 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 19 (2000) (considering, additionally, risks of harm to injurers
themselves).
10. Cf R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cos4 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 29-31 (1960)
(using a similar, now-famous, example); Bayern, Negligence, supra note 5, at 712.
11. For a more complete discussion of the details of the Hand Formula, see
discussion hfra Part III.A; see also Bayern, Neghgence, supra note 5, at 712-19.
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simply as private profits to the operator of the railroad) but causes
$95,000 in unavoidable harms externalized to others (for example,
because the railroad's unavoidable sparks burn down nearby
cornfields, or because its unavoidable crashes cause property damage),
then the railroad's operation is "efficient" and should be encouraged-
or at least not discouraged. That is, the railroad, taken on its own, is
said to produce wealth; it is better on instrumental economic grounds
for the railroad to exist and to operate than for it not to exist or not to
operate. Putting aside noneconomic concerns (such as those related to
fairness and the distribution of wealth), and assuming the figures of
$100,000 in gains and $95,000 in losses are accurate and complete, we
would prefer that the railroad run rather than that it not run.12 Of
course, to be clear, I am assuming that the $95,000 in harms cannot be
prevented by means of a simple and cheap precaution; this is what I
mean when I call the harms "unavoidable."
Compared to other ways of making $100,000, however, the
railroad may be far worse for society than its alternatives. We would
easily prefer someone to make $100,000 in a way that causes only
$2000 of harm to others (or, of course, ideally no such harm) than in a
way that causes $95,000 of harm to others, even putting aside fairness
and considering grounds of allocative efficiency alone. That is, even
though the operator of the railroad might earn $100,000, the railroad is
worth only a net $5000 to society because of the harms that it causes.
But another activity that earns its proprietor $100,000 may be worth
far more than $5000 overall-indeed, up to $100,000, if it externalizes
no harms.
12. The activity may be undesirable, of course, for any number of other reasons,
including concerns about fairness, rights, virtue, autonomy, and the overall social distribution
of wealth. I do not mean to minimize these concerns, which are often central both in
explaining and in justifying legal doctrines. See genemlyEISENBERG, supm note 3, at 14-42.
As noted in the text, however, my argument proceeds by showing that even on economic
grounds alone, many of the conclusions of the law-and-economics movement cannot be
justified.
13. If the harms totaling $95,000 could be prevented by means of a $5 precaution on
the part of the railroad-for example, if the $95,000 in harm reflects fires that sparks from
the railroad cause, and these sparks could be prevented if the railroad installs a $5 spark
arrestor-then clearly the operation of the railroad is unreasonable, even in purely economic
terms. I am treating the $95,000 harms as a cost that can be avoided only if the railroad stops
operating; that is, by hypothesis, the cheapest precaution that can prevent the $95,000 in
expected harms, in my example, is the cessation of the railroad's operation. Because this
would have a cost of $100,000 (in forgone benefits to the operator of the railroad), the Hand
Formula would deem the railroad's operation as cost-justified and therefore reasonable
(nonnegligent).
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Asking only whether a railroad is better than no railroad may
miss the point. The railroad may well be more efficient than its
absence but significantly less efficient than its alternatives. Often,
however, legal-economic modeling-such as the Hand Formula here,
though the Hand Formula is just an illustration-focuses (sometimes
just implicitly) on the comparison between an activity and its absence,
rather than the comparison between an activity and its alternatives.
For example, while an economic argument may purport to show
that A, a promisor in breach, and B, an injured promisee, together
benefit ex ante from a rule based on the theory of efficient breach, the
argument may fail to address the possibility that the proposed rule will
encourage other parties to take steps to become like A, the promisor in
breach, and to emulate his potentially opportunistic behavior.4 The
rule may provide incentives for people and businesses to arrange their
affairs in order to have the opportunities that A has. Even supposing
that a breach by A is better than perfomance by A, ex post,
however'-that is, even supposing that A and B together benefit from
breach, which is typically all that economic analyses purport to
show-giving A the opportunity to breach may give parties too much
of an incentive to be in the position of A rather than in the position of
C, an entirely unrelated kind of party who does not benefit from the
opportunity to breach a contract. Nonetheless, Cs activity may have
more social utility than A's, and as a result, the economic argument-
even though motivated by efficiency-will in fact undermine
efficiency." Similar concerns apply to many kinds of economic
arguments, from instrumental analyses of contract impossibility" to
economic attacks on the contract doctrine of unconscionability."
The same problem can be described in terms of opportunism. In
the case of a promisor in putatively efficient breach, or a railroader
who earns $100,000 but causes $95,000 in harms to others, the
wrongdoers earn more-potentially much more-than their overall
contribution to society. The railroader, if rational and selfish, will
14. For a different but related observation about the theory of efficient breach and its
broader effects, see Melvin A. Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual Specific Performance, the
Theory ofEfficient Breach, and the Indifference Winciple in Contract Law, 93 CALiF. L. REV
975, 1010-13 (2005) (arguing that the theory of efficient breach provides insufficient
incentives for planning and would harm contract law by undermining social norms).
15. This supposition is incorrect far more often than most law-and-economics
scholarship seems to realize. For a detailed analysis, see id at 997-1013.
16. See discussion nli Part lI.B for an analysis of the opportunity costs of
encouraging breach of contract.
17. See discussion Mfm Part IVB.
18. See discussion infa Part lVA.
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choose the $100,000 profit over an activity that earns him or her
$90,000 but causes no social harms; the promisor will, again if rational
and selfish, prefer entering into a contract that he or she may breach
than one where the opportunity of breach may not arise, even if the
latter contract creates more social value." In other words, when an
activity allows a private profit disproportionate to its social value,
parties who are selfish and rational will have too much incentive to
engage in it and not enough incentive to engage in more productive
activities.20
Though the general form of the concern that I have described
arises occasionally in the legal-economic literature,2' legal economists
overall are not sufficiently concerned with the problem. One reason is
perhaps that the problem does not arise-that is, it is impossible as a
matter of theoretical economics-if several deep assumptions are
made about the perfection of certain kinds of markets. This Part
proceeds by highlighting those assumptions and showing that, fairly
obviously, they are not correct.
19. For further discussion of this point, including a response to the Coasean
objections that might oppose it, see discussion mfira Part III.B.
20. It is important to stress, again, that both the "less productive" and the "more
productive" activities are efficient in the sense that when considered in isolation, it is better
(on grounds of efficiency alone) for them to occur than for them not to occur. The problem is
not that wealth-destroying activity may occur in isolation; it is that wealth-promoting activity
may occur with excessive frequency compared to activities that create even more wealth.
Again, this is not an issue if activities' costs and benefits are evaluated with metrics that
accommodate their alternatives-if, for instance, we consider opportunity costs in activities'
valuations, as we might begin to do when fully considering the costs of capital and other
production factors as transaction costs. My point again, however, is that arguments like the
Hand Formula and the theory of efficient breach fail to do this appropriately.
21. If seen as a problem of opportunism, my critiques share features with those by
other commentators concerned, ordinarily in somewhat more focused contexts, with the
opportunism associated with wealth transfer rather than the social productivity associated
with wealth production. See, eg., DAvID D. FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY: AN INTERMEDIATE
TEXT 476 (2d ed. 1990) ("The analysis of rent seeking suggests that, at least under some
circumstances, monopoly profit is not a transfer to the firm from its customers but a net loss.
The higher the monopoly profit, the more resources the firm will burn up ... in the process
of getting it. If so, perhaps the best solution to the problem posed by monopoly is not
regulation but taxation . .. ."); Ronald H. Coase, Blackmail, 74 VA. L. REv. 655, 674 (1988)
("Blackmail involves the expenditure of resources in the collection of information which, on
payment of blackmail, will be suppressed. It would be better if this information were not
collected and the resources were used to produce something of value."); Anthony T.
Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contrcts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1978) (proposing a rule concerning disclosure of potentially valuable information in contract
law that aims to encourage investment in productive rather than redistributive information
gathering).
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A. TheiddenFalseAssumpdonThatAllActivityThatIsMore
Efficient than ItsAbsence Will Occur
One central thesis of this Article is that many apparently
freestanding economic arguments that purport to demand particular
conclusions in the private law, such as the Hand Formula and the
theory of efficient breach, depend in complex ways on broader
economic assumptions that have little or nothing to do with the private
law. These broader assumptions are varied, but they have a general
conclusion in common: namely, the notion that all activity that is
efficient on its own (compared in isolation to its absence) will occur.
For example, assuming that a business opportunity like our
hypothetical railroad that produces $100,000 in private profits while
causing $95,000 in expenses to others exists, the structure of many
economic arguments in the private law assumes, at least implicitly, that
the opportunity will be fulfilled-that is, that the railroad will run, and
that someone will make $100,000 in profits and cause $95,000 in
harms.22
If this assumption were true, this Article's general concern with
the alternatives and opportunity costs of activities would drop away.
To see why, consider two hypothetical railroads, each "efficient" in
isolation but one more efficient than the other: Railroad A nets its
22. There is a technical wrinkle threatening this point, which is that the example does
not necessarily make clear the role of the transaction costs of organizing and operating the
railroad. That is, economists might say that the railroad will run unless the transaction costs
of organizing and continuing its operation exceed its profits. To put it differently, if the
business opportunity of a $100,000 railroad exists but does not get taken up by some
entrepreneur, the transaction costs must, tautologically, be greater than $100,000. (These
transaction costs may come in the form of difficulties in determining that the business
opportunity exists, evaluating its expected profits, bargaining in support of its organization
and operation, and so on.) This evaluation of the transaction costs is just definitional,
however; it is a tautological way of saying that if the railroad ends up operating, the
transaction costs must not have been great enough to stop it, in view of its profits-and
conversely that if the railroad does not operate, the transaction costs must have been too great.
This sort of transaction cost does not directly affect the Article's main argument. For the
purposes of the main argument, we can assume that the $100,000 figure for the railroad's
stated profits accommodates the sort of transaction-specific costs and benefits that law-and-
economics arguments typically associate with the railroad's operation. The point of my main
argument is that even after ordinary transaction costs are considered, profitable activity may
not occur; that $100,000 in profits for the railroad is possible afer the sort of transaction
costs associated with searching for, identifying, evaluating, and bargaining about the
railroad's business opportunities still does not imply that the railroad will run, because there
are neither perfectly efficient factor markets nor unlimited factor resources. Of course, we
might define the term "transaction costs" to include the inefficiencies in factor markets, but
that does not change the analysis; it just leads me to restate my argument as one that shows
that legal-economic arguments commonly fail, at least implicitly, to recognize particular
kinds of transaction costs that prevent efficient activity from occurring.
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owner $100,000 but externalizes $95,000 in harms, and Railroad B
nets its owner $90,000 but externalizes $2000 in harms. This Article's
general concern is that the law will encourage Railroad A over
Railroad B, but if all activities that we might call efficient in isolation
occur, then the concern does not appear: both Railroad A and Railroad
B will run, so it does not matter that the law encouraged Railroad A to
run.
To put it differently, if all activities efficient in isolation will
occur, then from an instrumental perspective concerned with social
wealth, encouraging Railroad A causes no harm; from such a
perspective, we want Railroad A to run, and encouraging it has no
effect on Railroad B's chance of running, because all activity that is
efficient in isolation will occur.
On the other hand, if the assumption that all activities efficient in
isolation will occur is not correct, then there may of course be
substantial harm in encouraging Railroad A, because doing so may
divert resources away from Railroad B. It may also divert resources
away from otherwise entirely unrelated activities, because in some
sense all activities are economically interchangeable; for example, at
least at some point in the life of the railroad's operator, he or she, at
least theoretically, could have decided to choose an entirely different
line of work, becoming a baseball player or a scientist. Accordingly,
encouraging a railroad to operate tends to discourage other businesses
from operating; the law cannot have its cake and eat it too.
The assumption that all activity will occur as long as it is efficient
in isolation is, however, manifestly wrong in the real world. The
general reason that the assumption is wrong is that markets for
production factors, including very broad economic factors such as
capital and credit, are imperfect.
B. The Reasons for Factor-Market Imperfection
That capital markets and credit markets" are imperfect should be
evident from recent history.
A common, and fortunate, reaction to the global economic
turmoil of the last several years has been a growing skepticism of the
predictions of formal modeling and dogmatic economics. Stock
23. Occasionally the term "capital markets" refers to both equity markets and debt
markets. See, e.g., PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLLAM D. NORDHAUS, EcoNoMics 9, 160-65




markets have swung wildly,24 and credit necessary to fund economic
activity has been threatened by weaknesses in banks." One cause of
these events, at least roughly, was an overreliance on predictive
economic models.2 6 Fittingly, public policy making and rhetoric has
seemed to shift away-at least for a time-from abstract social-
scientific theory and toward a kind of pragmatic intellectual pluralism,
focusing on "what works" rather than on what predetermined
reductionistic models conclude.27 Richard Posner, widely credited with
many of the early insights in law and economics,2 8 has himself written
a book in which he observes the "failure of the economics profession
to have grasped the dangers that have now produced the first U.S.
depression since the 1930s."29
But the appropriate conclusions to draw from newly prominent
inefficiencies in capital and credit markets do not stop with a
24. SeeVikas Bajaj, AnotherAfemoon Turns Dark as Worry Sends Stocks Plunging,
N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 10, 2008, at Al; Michael M. Grynbaum, Cheer Fades as Stocks Plunge 9%,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2008, at Bl; Jack Healy & David Jolly, OnceAgaib, Stocks Slide in Last
Hour of Tmdhg, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2008, at B4; Javier C. Hernandez, As Confident
Investors Race to Stocks, the Dollar Weakens Further, N.Y TIMES, Nov. 10, 2009, at Bl;
Javier C. Hernandez, A Downward Spiml Continues as US. Stocks Fall Below 10,000
Benchmark, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2010, at B9; Steve Lohr & Jack Healy, Glimmer offHope
Sets Offa Rally in Beaten Stocks, N.Y TIMES, Mar. 13, 2009, at Al; Gerry Shih, Stocks &
Bonds: Pessimism Still Grips Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2009, at B 1.
25. See Edmund L. Andrews & Mark Landler, US. May Take Ownersh Stake in
Banks To Ease Credit Crisis, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 9, 2008, at Al; David Stout, Geithner To
Unveil Plan To Revive Credit Flow and Monitor Banks'Aid Use, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 1, 2009, at
A18.
26. This overreliance arguably applied both narrowly and broadly. Narrowly, too
much faith in formal analyses of the risks of mortgage-backed securities appears to have led
to a misunderstanding among banks and other private businesses of the value of those assets.
See, e.g., JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 6, at 124 ("As housing prices took off, it became easy
to build models showing that [mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations]
had virtually no risk. . . ."). More broadly, though admittedly more debatably, the regulatory
environment that allowed for an increasing dependence on securities that turned out to be
misvalued appears, itself, to have resulted in part from an overreliance on economic models
that disfavored regulation. See id. at 68-87; see also Edmund L. Andrews, Greenspan
Concedes Flaws in Deregulatory Approach, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2008, at B I ("Greenspan
[the chair of the Federal Reserve of the United States from 1987 to 2006] admitted that he
had put too much faith in the self-correcting power of free markets . . . .").
27. See, e g., Brian Knowlton, Obama Promises Quick Relief for Governors, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 3, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/03/us/politics/03transition.html
("'We are not going to be hampered by ideology in trying to get this country back on track,'
[said then President-elect Barack Obama.] 'We want to figure out what works."'). The same
article reports that Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger of California "urged lawmakers to 'get
off of their rigid ideologies."' Id
28. See, e g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, Traditional Versus Economic Analysis:
Evidence from Cardozo and Posner Torts Opinions, 62 FLA. L. REv. 667, 667-70 (2010).
29. RICHARDA. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM 328 (2009).
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generalized caution in abstract modeling. Beyond broad lessons that
placing too much faith in formal models can lead businesses and
policy makers down dangerous paths, there are several important
specific analytical conclusions to be drawn-in private law, perhaps
surprisingly-from the increasing recognition that capital markets,
credit markets, and other deep features of the economic landscape do
not function with anything close to perfect efficiency.
A factor market is a market in which the factors (or inputs) of
economic production, like money, equipment, and the services of
workers, are bought and sold." What ties together my concern for
these markets, in analyzing the private law, is that scarcity and
inefficiency in them prevent some otherwise productive activities from
occurring. Because of factor-market limitations, even transactions for
which the transaction-specific costs and benefits make an activity
appear efficient may not be able to occur. For example, it might be
privately and socially efficient for someone to attend an expensive law
school when the tuition is compared against the benefits of going to
the school, but that possibility may not be available if the prospective
student cannot borrow money to pay tuition. Similarly, an otherwise
efficient opportunity for a business to expand may be prevented by its
inability to secure financing.
Technically speaking, factor limitations and factor-market
inefficiencies could be regarded as ordinary transaction costs." For
example, we can interpret the inability to secure funding (either as
equity or as debt) as a transaction cost that prevents a business from
engaging in an activity that would otherwise be profitable. Similarly,
we can say that a potential activity is not "efficient" or "wealth-
producing" if it cannot occur because of factor-market limitations or
inefficiencies. But law-and-economics arguments in contract law and
tort law ordinarily do not consider this kind of cost when evaluating
the transaction-specific costs and benefits (injury-causing behaviors,
precautions against them, breach of contract, precaution against
breach, and so on) of the kinds of activities with which economic
arguments about the private law are concerned. For example, for many
legal-economic conclusions like "contracting parties A and B can,
together, achieve more contractual surplus under a rule of damages
30. See SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supr note 23, at 9 (classifying "factors of
production" into "three broad categories: land, labor, and capital"). In their widely used
textbook, Samuelson and Nordhaus provide an extended and appropriately cautious
introduction to factor markets and general equilibrium theory. Id. at 229-98.
31. Cf discussion supm note 22.
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based on the theory of efficient breach than on an opposing rule," the
supporting argument often, at least implicitly, attempts to accommo-
date transaction costs like bargaining costs in concluding that A and B
both benefit from a particular legal rule.32 But the same argument will
often fail to accommodate the broader market effects of the rule in
question under circumstances where factor markets are imperfect and
factors to production are limited.
Recent history has highlighted the problematic assumption that
factor markets operated with perfect efficiency, but market failures in
factor markets should come as no surprise in general. For a credit
market-that is, a market in which people can lend and borrow
money-to operate perfectly, all the market participants would need to
have perfect information about (1) which other parties were interested
in borrowing or lending, (2) all the characteristics of potential
counterparties that affected the likelihood of repayment (that is, of the
creditiskor defaultiskof all counterparties), and (3) their own future
tolerances for risk and desire for the return associated with lending or
borrowing money. Moreover, all parties would need to be able to
process this information perfectly and rationally. These prerequisites
should, on their face, seem clearly quite strong; information and its
processing are perfect in almost no contexts. But recent macroecono-
mic experience has shown that the assumptions characterize modem
markets particularly poorly; for example, credit markets are so
complicated that evaluating the counterparty risk associated with a
particular instrument requires more than a straightforward analysis.3
Markets for equity rather than debt-such as stock markets-are
imperfect for similar reasons related to informational incompleteness.34
The public capital markets, such as the New York Stock Exchange,
also suffer from swings that seem to result from traders' emotions,"
from short-term planning and thinking, 3  and from market
32. See discussion mifa Part III.B.
33. See Manuel A. Utset, Complex Financial Institutions and Systemic Risk, 45 GA.
L. REv. 779 (2011).
34. See PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, EcONOMICS, ORGANIZATION &
MANAGEMENT 467-73 (1992); see also Note, Tort as a Debt Market: Agency Costs, Strategic
Debt, and Borrowzng Against the Future, 115 HARv. L. REv. 2294, 2309 n.80 (2002)
("[C]apital markets often suffer from incomplete information and frequently fail to
incorporate insider information." (citing MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra)).
35. See generally Henry T.C. Hu, Faith and Magic: Investor Beliefs and Government
Neutrality, 78 TEX. L. REv. 777 (2000).
36. See Editorial, Can You Trust the Market., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2011, at A20
("Long-term, buy-and-hold investors are still nursing losses because of reckless games played
by big banks and short-term traders.").
148 [Vol. 86:135
FALSE EFFICIENCY
manipulations7 -as well as, apparently, from simple technical errors,
including those that caused the Dow Jones Industrial Average to drop
almost ten percent on May 6, 2010, for what amounted to no
38
substantive economic reason.
The upshot of all these imperfections is that many activities that,
economically speaking, ought to proceed in view of their transaction-
specific costs and benefits-that is, activities that are better than
nothing, that produce wealth compared to their absence-end up being
unable to occur. Consider a variation of the railroad example I have
presented throughout: a railroad can make $100,000 while causing
$95,000 of externalized harm, while a hotel might earn $90,000 while
externalizing no harm at all. Conceive these two potential endeavors
as rival business opportunities. That is, a hypothetical entrepreneur
might have the opportunity to engage in them on their merits. The
entrepreneur might decide to avoid both business opportunities, to
pursue one or the other, or to pursue both.
If credit and capital markets were perfect and there were no other
transaction-specific costs in the way (such as an irrational distaste for
the business of hospitality on the part of the entrepreneur, a failure to
understand the railroad's costs and benefits, or bargaining costs
associated with organizing and operating a hotel or a railroad), there is
indeed no reason to think the entrepreneur would not pursue both
activities. Each is profitable (hypothetically, in view of their
transaction-specific costs and benefits), so why would the entrepreneur
want to avoid pursuing them? He can make $100,000 from the
railroad and $90,000 from the hotel; the simple decision is to operate
both. But unless the entrepreneur either has capital or can obtain
financing, he may not be able to pursue both. For example, if the
railroad and the hotel each requires a capital outlay of $50,000 to start
up (for instance, to renovate a building for the hotel or to purchase an
engine for the railroad), the entrepreneur will not be able to pursue
both activities unless he can find $100,000 in financing, either by
borrowing money or by convincing others to take equity stakes in his
future companies. The imperfections of the capital and credit markets
may prevent him from doing so. For example, even if the entrepreneur
37. See id.; see also Reuters, SEC To Study Rapid-Fire Stock Orders, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 8, 2010, at B9.
38. See Graham Bowley, The Flash Crash, im Miniature, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2010, at
B I ("But even though regulators have identified the main source of the drop as a sale of a
large block of futures contracts by a mutual fund in Kansas, some worry that today's fractured
electronic stock market has become so unstable that another large sale or a simple error could
incite a broader crash.").
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is competent and creditworthy, and even if the future value of the
businesses is clear, credit may simply be unavailable in a dysfunctional
credit market; capital may not flow freely because of all the problems
endemic to capital markets. As a result, the entrepreneur might only
be able to obtain, say, $60,000 in financing. That is enough for only
one activity. With that amount of financing, a legal regime based on
the Hand Formula will cause the entrepreneur to pursue the railroad, in
spite of its social costs, because the private profit of the railroad is
greater than the private profit of the hotel. As a result, the Hand
Formula will lead directly to inefficiency by promoting a less efficient
activity over a better one. The Hand Formula's distortion matters
precisely because only one of the candidate activities can proceed.
Of course, capital markets and credit markets are not the only
kinds of factor markets. Factor markets are often taken to include
labor markets as well, labor being a factor to production just as capital
is-and indeed, a factor in a market that is probably far less perfect
even than capital and credit markets." The imperfections in labor
markets, too, ensure that not all activity that is (otherwise) efficient can
occur.
As a very simple example, building on the same one we have
been using, suppose that in Newtown, there is just one unemployed
worker who, for at least $35,000 a year, is willing to work serving a
critical function in the operation either of a railroad or of a hotel.
Suppose, for argument's sake, there is nobody else in the world willing
to come to Newtown to earn $35,000 to work in the same roles.40 A
39. As Michael Trebilcock and Thomas Boddez put it:
The economic assumption of perfect thobility in factor markets is less valid in the
context of labor than it is in the context of capital. The transaction costs which
accompany the flow of capital from one use to another tend to be small when
contrasted with the financial and psychic costs borne by individuals forced to
retrain or relocate in order to obtain alternate employment. In addition to the
imperfect mobility of labor, a claim to compensation can be based on the inability
to diversify investments in human capital. Particularly in cases of highly
specialized human capital investments, the worker assumes a high degree of
undiversified risk.
Michael J. Trebilcock & Thomas M. Boddez, The Case for Liberalking North American
Trade Remedy Laws, 4 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 12 (1995).
40. This is obviously too strong an assumption of labor-market imperfection, but it
does not affect the form of the critique I am making; suppose what was at issue was not
whetheranyone would move but how quickly others could get up and running in a new job in
Newtown. Or suppose the problem is analyzed at a broader level-say, 30,000 workers in a
city are currently employed, and advertising for workers outside the city leads to greater costs
and relocation expenses, and so on. The underlying and relatively straightforward point is the
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national railroad line and a national hotel chain are both interested in
expanding their business to Newtown. The railroad owner stands to
earn $45,000 gross profits for the first year of its operation but expects
to externalize $20,000 of harm (in the form of hard-to-avoid injuries,
fires to nearby cornfields, or whatever else); the hotel owner stands to
earn $44,000 for the first year of its operation with no externalized
costs. Given the costs and other features of the bargaining landscape,
suppose each proprietor is unwilling to engage his or her own time and
other hard-to-quantify resources, or to accept the risk of business
losses, to earn less than $10,000 in Newtown.4 1 Thus, the owner of the
railroad will pay the worker up to $36,000; the hotel chain will pay up
to $35,000. Presumably, if he is aware of both offers and the working
conditions are otherwise equally desirable, the worker will choose to
work for the railroad; the hotel will not be able to take advantage of a
business opportunity it would have had if the railroad did not exist or
operate. Thus, a rule that encourages the railroad to operate-as the
Hand Formula does in this case, because it lets the railroad cause
$20,000 of harm without paying for it, thus allowing it to earn more
than the hotel-works directly to discourage the hotel from operating,
even though the hotel is more efficient from society's perspective than
the railroad (because it leads to a net $44,000 in gains rather than the
railroad's $45,000-$20,000, or $25,000, in gains).
As with capital and credit markets, the problem in this example
would probably go away if labor markets were perfect; surely someone
else in the world is willing to work for $35,000 at the hotel, but the
unavailability of that person prevents an otherwise efficient transaction
from occurring. Consequently, the Hand Formula's implicit disregard
for the efficiency of alternatives leads to a directly inefficient outcome.
C Other ImplicitAssumptions in Law-and-Economics Analysis h
the rivate Law
A different way to conceive deeper assumptions that apparently
freestanding economic arguments in tort law and contract law make is
to frame the assumptions in terms of perfect competition within
industries. Take, again, the example of the railroad and the hotel. The
same in all these cases, which is that labor-market imperfection makes it impossible for
activities that would otherwise be efficient to occur.
41. This again is a stylized assumption-really, a simplification that abstracts away
more complicated underlying economic features of the problem-that does not matter. For
example, the cost of capital in either case could be quantified, as could the risk aversion of the
various parties, rather than my simply stating a $10,000 profit margin. But it does not matter.
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railroad earns $100,000 but causes $95,000 of externalized harm; the
hotel earns $90,000 while causing no externalized harm. My chief
contention has been that in such a state of affairs, the Hand Formula
directly encourages an inefficient choice between the railroad and the
hotel.
A potential response to this contention, however, is that while that
problem may arise in a static world, once we consider dynamic
incentives to enter and exit industries the problem will not be
significant. For example, because the railroad is worth more to society
(gross) than the hotel, more actors will seek to run railroads than
hotels, leading to less of a profit margin for railroads; eventually, a new
marginal railroad will produce less than $95,000, meaning that it will
not be efficient any longer because its costs will be greater than its
benefits. Eventually, entrepreneurs will switch to the hotel over the
railroad. In other words, the market will address the problem I have
raised.
There are two problems with analysis of this type. First, it does
not even get off the ground unless markets are perfectly competitive,
and it would be just as odd and damaging for a purportedly
freestanding argument in tort law or contract law to depend on the
notion that markets in the control and operation of railroads and hotels
are perfectly competitive as for them to assume that factor markets are
perfect. Second, it does not, fundamentally, address my principal
concern. It is true that activities that outperform will tend to attract
more actors, but when that outperformance does not correspond to
overall social benefit, there is no reason to assume the overall market
dynamics are efficient from society's perspective. Thus, a world in
which dozens of entrepreneurs have flocked to railroads, driving down
the supernormal return associated with operating railroads, is still a
world in which there is too much railroading, and not enough hotel
operation, in view of the respective costs and benefits of the two
activities.
To summarize, one way to understand the foundational problem
with which this Article is concerned is to recognize the hidden
assumptions in many legal-economic arguments that it exposes. There
is at least one way to salvage economic reasoning from my critique in
this Article, and that is to assume that capital markets, credit markets,
and other so-called factor markets all operate perfectly. In other words,
by assuming that such markets are perfect-and only by so
assuming-economists can defeat my critique. Of course, however,
the assumption is not correct.
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It is important to recognize, again, that the assumptions regarding
capital markets, credit markets, and so on are not obviously or
intuitively related to the private law. My conclusion at this stage, in
other words, is that law-and-economics arguments like the Hand
Formula depend in subtle ways on significantly broad perfection in
markets that, at first glance, have nothing to do directly with tort law.
Focusing on conceptions of efficiency that are too limited, like "the
cost of precaution and the cost of expected harm"42 from accidents
ignores broader efficiencies; as a result, reaching particular policy
conclusions in law on the basis of economic reasoning that rests on
limited premises tends not toward efficiency but toward inefficiency.
To put it differently, economic arguments that assume the perfection of
factor markets do not even aim to promote true, overall allocative
efficiency; instead, they concern only efficiency in narrow
circumstances that do not correspond to reality.43
At this stage, it is important to recognize that my argument is
negative and critical: I am not constructing a basis, here, for deciding
how to determine the correct pricing of activities, nor am I presenting a
definitive solution to the problems I identify. My argument is, more
modestly, simply that we need to be sensitive to the problem.
III. THE NEGLECT OF ALTERNATIVES IN FOUNDATIONAL TORT AND
CONTRACT MODELS
This Article has already used the Hand Formula in tort law as a
running example of the inefficiency of narrow economic argumenta-
tion that assumes the perfection of factor markets (and thus that all
activity that is more efficient than its absence will occur). This Part
spells out my concern with the Hand Formula in more detail; it then
considers how the problem this Article has described manifests itself in
the theory of efficient breach in contract law. Part IV considers
further, more specific arguments in tort and contract law.
42. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICs 321 (4th ed. 2004). For
the thorough theoretical introduction into the literature of the notion that tort law is concerned
with the combination of costs from accidents and costs of precaution, see GuIDO CALABRESI,
THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND EcoNoMIc ANALYSIs (1970).
43. Indeed, in this sense, law-and-economics arguments are conceptualistic: they aim




A. Tort Law Opportunism, the Hand Formula, andAcdvity Levels
Consider again, as probably the most fundamental example of a
legal rule that suffers from the problem I am describing, a negligence
rule based on what has come to be known as the Hand Formula in tort
law. It is worth, at this stage, providing some background on the Hand
Formula. Fundamentally, it analyzes precautions that potential injurers
and victims might take in terms of their cost-effectiveness." Judge
Learned Hand, in one early description of the formula, stated it as
follows: "[I]f the probability [of injury] be called P; the [amount of
the] injury, L; and the burden [of precaution against the injury], B;
liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e.,
whether B [is less than] PL."
Judge Hand did not conceive the formula as something meant to
be applied literally; he appears to have intended it as a loose guide for
those making factual determinations about which behaviors are
reasonable and which are not." Nonetheless, his formulation is often
taken literally and formally; for example, Richard Posner has built
upon it by formalizing it, separating its absolute form from its
marginal form, and so on.4
Perhaps even more significantly, the Restatement (Third) of Torts
adopts the formula explicitly, essentially in its algebraic form:
A person acts negligently if the person does not exercise reasonable
care under all the circumstances. Primary factors to consider in
ascertaining whether the person's conduct lacks reasonable care are the
foreseeable likelihood that the person's conduct will result in harm, the
44. See Bayern, Negligence, supm note 5, at 713-14.
45. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 E2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
46. Judge Hand later wrote:
It is indeed possible to state an equation for negligence in the form, C [equals] P
[times] D, in which the C is the care required to avoid risk, D, the possible injuries,
and P, the probability that the injuries will occur, if the requisite care is not taken.
But of these factors care is the only one ever susceptible of quantitative estimate,
and often that is not. The injuries are always a variable within limits, which do not
admit of even approximate ascertainment; and, although probability might
theoretically be estimated, if any statistics were available, they never are; and,
besides, probability varies with the severity of the injuries. It follows that all such
attempts are illusory, and, if serviceable at all, are so only to center attention upon
which one of the factors may be determinative in any given situation.
Moisan v. Loftus, 178 F.2d 148, 149 (2d Cir. 1949); see also Stephen G. Gilles, United States
v. Carroll Towing Co.: The Hand Formulak Home Por;n TORTS STORIES 11, 28 (Robert L.
Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2003).
47. RICHARDA. POSNER, ECONomic ANALYSIS OF LAW 168-69 (7th ed. 2007).
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foreseeable severity of any harm that may ensue, and the burden of
precautions to eliminate or reduce the risk of harm.48
The comment to the Restatement adds:
Conduct is negligent if its disadvantages outweigh its advantages, while
conduct is not negligent if its advantages outweigh its disadvantages.
The disadvantage in question is the magnitude of risk that the conduct
occasions; as noted, the phrase "magnitude of the risk" includes both
the foreseeable likelihood of harm and the foreseeable severity of harm
that might ensue. The "advantages" of the conduct relate to the burden
of risk prevention that is avoided when the actor declines to incorporate
some precaution. The actor's conduct is hence negligent if the
magnitude of the risk outweighs the burden of risk prevention.49
In prior work, I described theoretical economic shortcomings of
negligence regimes based on the Hand Formula on its own terms,50 and
I began to describe some broader problems associated with the
opportunism that it enables." In this Part, I mount in more detail the
critique that I outlined earlier in this Article.
The critique is essentially twofold. Its first part has already been
telegraphed because I already used the Hand Formula (in my examples
involving the choice between operating a railroad and operating a
hotel) as my central example of a supposedly freestanding economic
argument in tort law that nonetheless depends on broader economic
perfection outside tort law. That is, the first part of the critique is that
just because an activity is "efficient" in the sense that it produces
wealth compared to its absence does not mean we want the activity to
occur, even on instrumental grounds.
Recall that in my example, if a railroad were the only possible
business opportunity (that is, if the hotel did not exist), society would,
from the perspective of welfare maximization, want it to operate rather
than not to operate. In other words, even given the harm it
externalizes, the railroad is still socially valuable; its expected net
present value, from society's perspective, is still positive. If the
question were evaluated in isolation, as if it were the only possible
business any entrepreneur could start, any rational and public-minded
social planner concerned only with instrumental efficiency who had to
answer the question, "Should there be a railroad here?" would answer
48. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 3
(2005).
49. Id. § 3 cmt. e.
50. Bayern, Negligence, supra note 5, at 731-38.
51. Id. at 740-49.
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"Yes." To state it more formally, as between operating a railroad and
operating nothing, operating the railroad is Kaldor-Hicks efficient."
But because there are business alternatives for the firm other than
railroads, the danger of a negligence regime-that is, of a regime that
allows the firm in our example to operate a railroad without paying for
all its social costs-is that it gives activities that externalize costs an
advantage. To be clear, my argument is not that strict liability would
necessarily be more efficient than a negligence regime; which one is
superior would be almost impossible to deduce without a sensitive
look at the various costs and benefits of each business activity and
also, for complex reasons I have discussed elsewhere," of the activities
that the people who suffer the railroad's harm engage in (such as
owning houses or businesses in areas where the railroad might
operate). My argument, instead, is just that the Hand Formula poses
the danger I have described.
The second part of my critique concerns activity-levels
arguments. A substantial and important body of prior economic work
concerned with "activity levels" has suggested what might seem to be
a way around the problem I have described; if it indeed were, my
critique would not be against economic reasoning as a whole but just
against a form of economic reasoning that had become outdated.
However, though activity-levels arguments are significant, they are
concerned with a problem different from the one I am describing.
Activity-levels arguments are due, originally, to Steven Shavell.54
The principal contribution of such arguments is a recognition that if an
actor does not bear the risk of injuries as long as he or she acts safely
or reasonably, the actor may nonetheless engage in too much of an
activity. For example, if I am sure that I can avoid all liability for car
accidents by driving reasonably, then I might drive safely (to avoid
liability), but I might still drive too often. I might, in other words, not
take into account the costs that my safe driving imposes on others-
even if it increases the likelihood of accidents (because even safe
driving sometimes causes accidents). Shavell originally described the
problem as follows:
By definition, under the negligence rule all that an injurer needs to
do to avoid the possibility of liability is to make sure to exercise due
care if he engages in his activity. Consequently he will not be
52. See POSNER, supra note 47, at 13-15.
53. Bayern, Neghgence, supm note 5, at 731-38.




motivated to consider the effect on accident losses of his choice of
whether to engage in his activity or, more generally, of the level at
which to engage in his activity; he will choose his level of activity in
accordance only with the personal benefits so derived. But surely any
increase in his level of activity will typically raise expected accident
losses (holding constant the level of care). Thus he will be led to
choose too high a level of activity; the negligence rule is not
"efficient."
Of course, if courts could directly judge whether people were driving
too often, they could declare that decision to be negligent and thus
impose liability for it.16  But courts cannot easily judge whether
someone drives too much; they do not have access to enough
information to make that determination, and they do not have the
expertise or institutional competence to make decisions like it.
Shavell, very early, recognized that the problem of activity levels
makes it impossible to develop simply efficient rules in tort law. His
argument is technical," but at heart it presents a simple recognition:
because an injurer and a victim in tort law cannot both bear the
financial risk of the same accident (unless we were to radically
restructure tort law to involve payments to the state or to third parties),
the law can provide incentives for efficient levels of activity for only
one of them. Thus, for example, as between a safely operated railroad
and the nearby cornfields that its operation might nonetheless
unavoidably bum down, the law can either assign (strict) liability to the
railroad or make the cornfields' owner suffer the harm without a legal
remedy (as it would under a rule of negligence). In the former case,
there might be too much incentive to run railroads (albeit reasonably
safely), whereas in the latter case there might be too much incentive to
grow corn on fields near railroad tracks (albeit reasonably safely). The
law cannot discourage both parties from engaging in their respective
activities excessively.
This Article's central critique may sound at first blush merely like
an activity-levels argument. That is, it may appear, in my example
concerning the choice between railroads and hotels, that the problem is
simply that there will be too much railroading and not enough hotel
operation. The railroad is, after all, operating safely, as far as the legal-
55. Id. at 2 (footnotes omitted).
56. See id. at 22-23; Bayern, Negligence, supra note 5, at 726-27.




economic analysis is concerned." But it should not operate-that is, if
it operates, we will see too much "safe" or "reasonable" railroading.
The difference between my critique and Shavell's understanding
of activity levels is that my critique is concerned with factors that have
nothing to do, directly, with tort law. The activity-levels argument, at
bottom, addresses the notion that at some levels of engagement, some
activities cause social harms that cannot be cost-justified. That is,
Shavell is concerned with "any increase in . . . level of activity [that]
will typically raise expected accident losses."" The problem with too
much "safe" automobile driving is conceived, as far as traditional
activity-levels arguments are concerned, in terms of the excess risk that
such driving will cause to other drivers; it is not concerned directly
with the motivation to drive rather than to engage in some other,
entirely unrelated activity. Shavell observes that although a driver
will choose to engage in the activity just up to the level at which the
personal benefit from a marginal increase would equal zero, it would be
best from society's viewpoint for him to engage in the activity only up
to the level at which his benefit from a marginal increase would equal
the (positive) social marginal cost in terms of accident losses.6
To put it differently, the frequency at which people drive is only
important to traditional activity-levels arguments if there is some level
at which too much driving is, on its own, socially inefficient-if it
would be better, past some point, for the hypothetical driver to do
nothing than to drive.'
My critique, however, is oriented differently; my argument is that
the problem remains even if there is no level at which driving is, on its
own terms, inefficient. To see the difference, consider the following
stylized example: there are unlimited supplies of two materials (say,
copper and coal) in the ground, waiting to be mined. To keep the
example numerically simple, we can measure the value of copper and
58. We know this from the terms of the hypothetical, which is that the railroad
produces $100,000 in gains while causing only $95,000 in losses. Recall that I am assuming,
in constructing the hypothetical, that there is no cheaper way to prevent the $95,000
externalized losses than the full cessation of the railroad's operations, at an opportunity cost
to the railroad of $ 100,000. See supm note 13 and accompanying text.
59. Shavell, supra note 54, at 2.
60. Id. at 2 n.3.
61. There is, again, a wrinkle underlying this point, which is that if marginal costs
and benefits of all activities are calculated correctly, and if a general economic equilibrium
prevails, see SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 23, at 160-65, the activity-levels
arguments appear to approach my concern. But my chief point in the text is that general
equilibria do notprevail-or, at least, that apparently freestanding arguments in tort law and
contract law should not assume that they do.
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coal against the number of hours it takes to extract them from their
natural stores; we can say, hypothetically, that an hour's effort
extracting coal yields $10 worth of coal and that an hour's effort
extracting copper yields $8 worth of copper. Suppose, however, that
mining coal causes $4 per hour in externalized harms (as health risks
to employees, damage to land, or what not). Suppose, for our
purposes, that we could not possibly mine either coal or copper fast
enough to cause their values to fall anytime soon.
In this example, there is essentially no activity-levels concern,
following the traditional economic understanding of activities levels.
Because the price of copper and coal do not marginally decline with
mining, there is no level at which is it not worthwhile to society,
overall, to mine the copper or the coal. And, as with my example
presenting the railroad versus the hotel, both coal mining and copper
mining in this example are efficient; if both could occur, we would
want both to occur. (The social value per hour of work mining coal is
$10-$4, or $6; the social value per hour of mining copper is $8.) But
because of limited capital, credit, labor, or other factors, we might have
to choose between mining coal and mining copper. The Hand Formula
will lead us, as in the railroad-and-hotel example, to make the wrong
choice, and activity-levels arguments concerned only with tort-related
incentives do not fix the problem; there is, again, no level in this
example at which we do not want coal mining to occur, if coal mining
is evaluated on its own.
Thus, in some sense, the orthodox understanding of activity
levels has nothing to say here. Like the Hand Formula itself, it is
concerned fundamentally with the rate of accidents. Posner drives that
point home:
Only when a class of activities can be identified in which activity-
level changes by potential injurers are the most efficient method of
accident prevention is there a compelling argument for imposing strict
liability. Conversely, in a class of activities in which activity-level
changes by potential victims are the most efficient method of accident
prevention, there is a strong argument for a rule of no liability ... .62
To reach social optimality, however, the efficiency of liability rules
cannot be evaluated exclusively from the perspective of determining
the optimal level of either the injurer's or the victim's activity in
isolation. In isolation, the harm externalized by mining coal in my
62. POSNER, supm note 47, at 179.
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example would not matter, because it is always efficient in isolation to
continue to mine coal.
It is worthwhile to stress that Shavell has long recognized that
activity-levels arguments on their own cannot lead to fully efficient
results." He observed in his original formulation of the arguments that
"there is no conceivable liability rule that induces parties to act
efficiently"; he continued: "[C]onsider any liability rule which may
depend on any or all of the following variables: the victim's losses, the
care he exercises, the care the injurer exercises. Then the liability rule
is not efficient."' That conclusion, of course, agrees with my
underlying observation that traditional analysis of tort-based
economics does not lead to efficient results. But economists did not,
over the last twenty years, take Shavell's conclusion as a call to engage
in a broader kind of economic reasoning in tort law than one that
concerned itself only with "the victim's losses, the care he exercises,
[and] the care the injurer exercises."' Economic reasoning has
remained fairly narrowly focused on those same goals."
B. Contract Law: Rent Seekng and the Theory ofEfficient Breach
1. The Theory in General
The theory of efficient breach is fundamental to the modern
economic understanding of contract law. Posner outlines the theory as
follows:"
[I]n some cases a party is tempted to break his contract simply because
his profit from breach would exceed his profit from completing
performance. He will do so if the profit would also exceed the
expected profit to the other party from completion of the contract, and
hence the damages from breach. So in this case awarding damages will
not deter a breach of contract. It should not. It is an efficient breach.
Posner illustrates the theory with the following example:
Suppose I sign a contract to deliver 100,000 custom-ground widgets at
100 apiece to A for use in his boiler factory. After I have delivered
10,000, B comes to me, explains that he desperately needs 25,000
custom-ground widgets at once since otherwise he will be forced to
63. See supm note 57 and accompanying text.
64. Shavell, supma note 54, at 19.
65. Id.
66. Cf Hershovitz, supra note 5, at 77.
67. For a discussion of the changes in Posner's formulation of the theory over the
years, and also of the origins of the theory, see Eisenberg, supla note 14, at 997-98.
68. POSNER, supl note 47, at 120.
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close his pianola factory at great cost, and offers me 150 apiece for
them. I sell him the widgets and as a result do not complete timely
delivery to A, causing him to lose $1,000 in profits. Having obtained
an additional profit of $1,250 on the sale to B, I am better off even after
reimbursing A for his loss, and B is also better off. The breach is
therefore Pareto superior. 9
The theory of efficient breach as thus outlined is severely
misguided for several reasons, most of which Professor Melvin
Eisenberg and others have detailed." The most significant flaws are in
fact relatively easy to describe once they are exposed: first, just
because B is willing to bid more than A after A signs a contract does
not mean that B values the goods more highly than A; A may simply
have cut a better deal or negotiated at a better time. Second, as even
Posner recognizes, breach is not the only way B (the user who
putatively places a higher value on the goods) can get the goods; he
could also buy them from A." Posner claims that it will be cheaper (in
terms of transaction costs) for the original seller to sell to B, but this is
little more than an arbitrary supposition, and it seems unlikely in view
of the extremely large transaction costs of the litigation that would
result from breach. Third, A's damages will not necessarily measure
A's costs for all the reasons that contract damages may fall short of the
full subjective damages that would make promisees indifferent
between performance and breach, such as rules concerning foreseea-
bility and certainty.
2. Factor-Market Imperfection and Its Relationship to Contract Law
The view of factor-market imperfection that I have offered
presents a further flaw. Specifically, the theory of efficient breach
would provide incentives to adopt the business of the seller in Posner's
example, or alternatively of B, the third-party buyer who asks for
breach. The theory of efficient breach, in this sense, is an argument in
favor of what Robert Nozick called "utility monsters";72 that is, people
who place a higher value on goods will, under the theory of efficient
breach, be able to transfer wealth toward themselves and destroy rights
of others in the name of efficiency. That alone does not lead to a
conclusion that the theory of efficient breach is in fact inefficient, but
it is strongly suggestive: if people can gain more rights simply by
69. Id.
70. Eg., Eisenberg, supo note 14, at 997-1016.
71. POSNER, supo note 47, at 120.
72. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 41 (1974).
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adjusting their preference, then most of the efficiencies of contract law
(in terms of enabling value-creating bargains) would be lost, and the
law would come to favor the preferences of people at the current
instant rather than the interests of those who once bargained about
their rights.
This problem with the theory of efficient breach interacts with
this Article's argument about the effects of factor-market imperfections
because it suggests that the theory provides too great an incentive to
become like-that is, to engage in the activities of-the original seller
or party B in Posner's example. That is, in Posner's example there will
be too strong an incentive either to become a seller who can breach or
to produce pianolas, and not enough of an incentive to produce
boilers-or, importantly, to do anythbng else."
The reasons for this conclusion, in a contractual setting, are
perhaps not as obvious as this Article's conclusions in tort law. As
noted, the central problem for our purposes is that the theory of
efficient breach increases the incentive to become one of the parties
that benefits from the contract that results from breach (the one
between the original seller and B in Posner's example) and less of an
incentive to become one of the parties that would benefit from a rule
that encouraged performance of the original contract. I focus on the
benefits to the parties of the respective contracts, collectively, because
for either contract, bargaining may assign the gains of the contract in
favor of either party-so we do not know, for instance, that the
conclusion of the second contract at the expense of the first helps
either the original seller or B individually, but we do have good reason
to think it relatively helps the two collectively.74 (Similarly,
encouraging performance of the first contract helps the original seller
and A, relatively speaking, but we do not know the individual gains of
either the original seller or A individually.)
Accordingly, allowing a breach of the contract reflects a transfer
of wealth from the group that is composed of A and the original seller
to the group that is composed of B and the original seller. Of course,
in theory this redistribution might be efficient rather than inefficient,
and it may or may not accompany whatever gains or losses may
otherwise be associated with the theory of efficient breach; my point
73. As noted previously, Professor Eisenberg has made a similar point; his was in
terms of incentives for planning rather than incentives to adopt lines of business, but the two
points are consistent and mutually supportive. See Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 10 10-13.




for now is only that there is a relative difference in the way that wealth
is distributed between a remedial regime in contract law that applies
the theory of efficient breach and one that rejects the theory. On
balance, unless the bargaining power of the parties is systematically
lopsided, we can expect the relevant redistribution will be from A to
both the original seller and B." Accordingly, under the theory of
efficient breach, there will be more of an incentive to enter either the
line of business of the original seller or the line of business of B. Or,
to state the matter more generally, there will be more of an incentive to
become either like (1) parties that have the opportunity to breach their
contracts and resell goods or services to third parties, or (2) the third
parties that benefit from such opportunities.
Of course, in the real world there may not be consistent or easily
identifiable classes that correspond to groups (1) and (2) above. If
there are not, then the theory of efficient breach may not be
problematic in the way I am describing. But there are strong reasons
to think that the theory of efficient breach will systematically hurt, and
help, some identifiable classes of parties more than others. For one
thing, those who have internalized a "moral norm of promise-keeping"
will be systematically less likely to breach their contracts than those
who have not, and thus will lose, relatively speaking, under a rule that
encourages breach." Moreover, those who are in a position to resell
goods and services (that is, merchants) are likely to benefit from the
theory of efficient breach more than those who are not (like typical
consumers). Similarly, third parties in industries that present sudden,
unexpected needs, with correspondingly high demand for goods and
services, will tend to benefit from the theory more than those in
industries with more predictable prices and preferences."
Accordingly, it is likely that the theory of efficient breach does
help some people and hurt others. It consequently provides a
distorting economic incentive in favor of the people it helps and
against those it hurts. In Posner's example, for instance, it probably
75. That is, A clearly loses on balance; B clearly wins; and the original seller can be
presumed to win, under the theory of efficient breach, if only because the theory rests without
penalty the perform-or-breach decision with him or her.
76. SeeEisenberg, supmnote 14, at 1012.
77. The reason for this is straightforward: parties like B (the third-party buyer after
the original contract is breached) are more likely to be those that could not anticipate their
needs in advance, whereas parties like A (who concluded a contract at a more favorable price)
are more likely to be able to anticipate their needs in advance. Those who can anticipate
needs in advance, in other words, are more likely to sign favorable contracts than those that
cannot. The theory of efficient breach disserves the former category of promisees in favor of
those with less stable or predictable preferences.
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leads to a greater incentive to manufacture pianolas than there would
otherwise be. Suppose the pianola factory owner would need to pay
160 instead of 150 for widgets without the theory of efficient breach;
the theory of efficient breach makes it correspondingly more
profitable to own a pianola factory.
As with all this Article's arguments, this distortion alone might
not be problematic if all activity that is efficient in isolation (that is,
again, better than its absence) can occur. Whether it costs 150 instead
of 160 to buy widgets for a pianola factory does not matter if
(1) producing pianolas is socially valuable, and (2) the consequent
diversion of resources into pianola factories does not, because of
factor-market imperfections, restrict activities that are even more
socially valuable. Encouraging pianola factory owners solely on the
basis of the former of these factors may, however, easily promote
inefficiency.
To put the problem differently, the theory of efficient breach, as
applied in Posner's example, rests implicitly on the premise that it is a
good thing for pianola production to occur. We know at least, from the
terms of Posner's example, that it is profitable for the pianola factory
proprietor to be in the business of manufacturing pianolas, or else he
would not be willing to bid for widgets in the first place. We do not,
however, know enough to conclude that the business should be
encouraged; to assume that it is socially valuable just because it is
valuable when its costs and benefits are calculated without regard for
the relative costs and benefits of other activities is to commit the
fallacy that this Article has described. Just like assuming that banking
should be encouraged because it is "productive," it may be wrong to
favor pianola factories just because some people want to engage in that
activity; their reasons for engaging in it can theoretically be more for
reasons of redistribution than for reasons of overall social efficiency.
And that becomes a problem when-but only when-factor-market
imperfection makes it impossible for all activities that are efficient in
isolation to occur.
To be clear, I am not suggesting that the theory of efficient breach
necessaily leads to inefficiency for the reasons I am describing; I am
only suggesting it is possible. My argument is that the theory of
efficient breach is, in view of factor-market imperfection, insufficient
to justify its conclusion; if factor markets are imperfect, the theory is
fully consistent with a state of affairs in which the theory of efficient
breach causes inefficiency because it encourages people to breach
contracts more for redistributive than for productive reasons.
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To determine whether the theory of efficient breach specifically
promotes inefficiency in an individual case, on the particular grounds I
am describing, we need, essentially, to evaluate the opportunism of the
original promisor and the third-party buyer. The opportunism, which
rests on an incentive to transfer wealth rather than to create it, leads to
the distortion with which this Article is concerned. That is, if the
theory of efficient breach is applied as a foundation for contract law's
remedial regime, the result will be that some parties will either (1) seek
breach when the result is that they profit but society profits less than
they do or (2) less directly, seek to become like those parties who can
benefit from such opportunistic breaches. As with this Article's tort
law argument, the problem is not specifically, for our purposes, that
actors will engage in socially harmful businesses; it is that they will
choose one socially beneficial business over another that is more
beneficial. For example, they may choose to become like the seller or
the pianola factory owner in Posner's example rather than choosing
something that does not externalize the costs (because of imperfect
damage measures and so on) in ways that the theory of efficient breach
permits. Thus, for example, the theory of efficient breach is likely to
give parties too much of an incentive to be in lines of business that
face unstable preferences and sudden, unpredictable needs.
3. Inefficiency in the Face of Bargaining
The ability of contractual parties to reallocate gains to one
another through bargains may seem to undermine the point I have
made so far. For example, if in Posner's example the original seller
and B collectively profit at the expense of A, we should expect that the
seller would offer A, or that A would demand, a lower price for the
greater risk of breach. Alternatively, the parties might liquidate
damages, specify in detail what does and does not count as breach, and
so on, in order to protect A's interests ex ante. Accordingly, it may not
seem problematic if the seller and B collectively benefit at A's
expense, for it may seem that in a dynamic world, bargaining will
simply address the problem.
This objection, of course, is correct to the extent that
bargaining-where perfect-addresses all economic problems that
may arise. That recognition is the heart of the Coase Theorem, which
concludes that perfect bargaining makes legal rules irrelevant because
parties can simply achieve allocative efficiency on their own." More
78. See generallyCoase, supra note 10.
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than forty years ago, Guido Calabresi saw that when the premises of
the Coase Theorem are accepted, even long-term inefficiencies that
legal rules aim to address drop away."
Even when considering the efficiency of rules in contract law,
however, it is improper to assume that bargaining is perfect and fully
costless. As noted, that assumption makes all legal rules irrelevant; in
a world without any transaction costs, the theory of efficient breach is
necessarily as efficient as any theory proposing its opposite. The
question is, as usual, what rule is best in our world. If we think that the
market is good enough that parties will expect breach at exactly the
right levels and bargain in view of its possibility, the theory of efficient
breach may not be inefficient, but it is precisely those cases in which it
does not matter anyway. To say it differently, the theory of efficient
breach could plausibly be efficient if parties bargained with it in mind.
There are, however, strong reasons to suppose that parties do not
bargain with it in mind."
In any event, if economic arguments must assume that bargaining
is perfect in order for them to justify their results, that is yet another
deep and potentially flawed assumption that the arguments make
without purporting to do so."' And it would be a particularly ironic
assumption given that, as the Coase Theorem describes, perfect
79. See Guido Calabresi, Tnsaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability
Rules-A Commen4 11 J.L. & EcoN. 67, 68 (1968) ("[I]f one assumes rationality, no
transaction costs, and no legal impediments to bargaining, all misallocations of resources
would be fully cured in the market by bargains. Far from being surprising, this statement is
tautological, at least if one accepts any of the various classic definitions of misallocation."
(footnote omitted)).
80. The details of those reasons are beyond the scope of this Article, but see
Eisenberg, supla note 14, at 1007-08, for an outline of them.
81. The assumption that parties can reassign contractual surplus with perfection and
ease appears to be so embedded in the contract literature that it is difficult to find examples
where the assumption is disputed, even though, of course, real-world experience suggests that
bargaining is not in fact perfect and that prices and other redistributive terms are often
constructed with economic imperfection. Professor Eisenberg is one of the few
commentators who recognizes this imperfection directly; for example, in suggesting that a
profit margin may be fixed in a particular practical context, he writes:
Nor is it true ... that there is no good economic reason for the notion that the
percentage markup is fixed. Based on observation, sellers often price by applying
a rule-of-thumb markup. Furthermore, there is a good economic reason for pricing
that way-it saves the administrative costs of one-by-one pricing decisions, and
allows pricing decisions to be made lower down the food chain.
Melvin A. Eisenberg, Impossibility Impracticability and Frustration-Professor Goldberg
Constructs an Imaginary Article, Attributes It to Me, and Then Cnticizes 14 2 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 383, 392-93 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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bargaining makes models like the theory of efficient breach essentially
pointless to begin with.
IV. THE NEGLECT OF ALTERNATIVES IN OTHER TORT AND
CONTRACT MODELS
A. Contract-Lmiting Rules: Unconscionability Mnmum Wage,
and Rent Control
1. The Form of the Problem
Classic economic understanding counsels against rules that
prevent private parties from entering into some bargains;82 these
include rules that strike down some contracts as unconscionable and
those that (often by statute) prevent contracts from adopting particular
terms, such as wages below a certain dollar figure or residential rent
above a calculated amount. These economic arguments, like the more
foundational models that Part III addressed, appear to assume
implicitly that factor markets are perfect; once factor-market
imperfection is recognized, it becomes clear that these arguments'
sweeping conclusions should be replaced by a more nuanced analysis.
Indeed, factor-market imperfection may point the way toward a clearer
analysis of contract-limiting rules than the one that the law currently
provides.
Consider, as an example, the debate about whether contract law
should prevent one party from extracting a large and "unfair" amount
of the contractual surplus." Suppose there is a factory owner that
82. See COOTER & ULEN, supm note 42, at 290-92; see also infra note 92 and
accompanying text.
83. Extracting an unfair amount of the contractual surplus is known as substantive
unconscionability in contract law. See 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON
CONTRACTS § 4.28, at 585 (3d ed. 2004). Rules prohibiting substantive unconscionability are
different from, and generally more controversial than, rules that protect parties against
proceduml unconscionability, which reflects a simple breakdown in the bargaining process as
a result of factors like information asymmetries or the use of form contracts. See id at 588-
89. For recent discussions of the merits of rules concerning unconscionability, see Larry A.
DiMatteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent Theory of Unconscionability An Empirical Study
ofLaw in Action, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1067 (2006); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Role of
Fault m Contract Law: Unconscionability Unexpected Circumstances, Interpretation,
Mistake, andNonperformance, 107 MICH. L. REv. 1413, 1415-18 (2009). For a leading legal-
economic view on substantive unconscionability, see Richard Craswell, Property Rules and
Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 20-29
(1993).
When I refer to unconscionability in this Article, I mean to indicate substantive
unconscionability unless the context suggests otherwise. Rules preventing procedurally
unconscionable contracts are generally as easy to defend as rules concerning fraud and
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would be able to pay his workers up to forty dollars a day because the
potential workers produce that much value for the factory. But the
potential workers have no better options in their locale and cannot
easily move, so they would accept wages as low as approximately fifty
cents a day to work. The factory owner knows this, so he offers fifty
cents a day for the work. Suppose the workers, being plentiful and
disorganized, accept the offer.
A basic economic argument against an unconscionability
doctrine-or a minimum-wage law-that would prevent this kind of
contract would be that the parties will not enter the contract unless they
both benefit from it, and therefore the contract is wealth-producing and
should be permitted or even encouraged.84 The workers would not
accept fifty cents a day if they had better alternatives. Accordingly, the
reasoning proceeds, preventing the contract would make at least one of
the parties, and probably both of them, worse off. The contract should
therefore be allowed. Maybe there are other reasons in favor of an
unconscionability doctrine or a minimum-wage law, an economist
might say-such as notions of fairness or broad social concerns about
the distribution of income and wealth. But efficiency, he or she would
continue, is not among them."
I should note that my goal is not specifically to defend the
efficiency of substantive-unconscionability rules in all contexts. My
aim is, as it has been before, to show that the sweeping conclusions of
legal-economic arguments are unfounded unless they assume factor-
market perfection.
The flaw, a variation of the one we have been discussing
throughout this Article, is as follows: systematically being able to
extract a large share of contractual surplus may give rise to what is
essentially an externality worth preventing. Suppose A can contract
with either B or C, but not both. To maximize social welfare, we want
the transaction that is most valuable to occur. But A wants the contract
that is privately more valuable to her, alone. If the contract with B has
a total surplus of $200 and the contract with Chas a total surplus of
$250, but A can extract 98% of the surplus in the case of B and only
72% of the surplus in the case of C, she will choose B (and get 98% of
$200, or $196) rather than C(and get 72% of $250, or $180).
duress, because when the bargaining mechanism breaks down, it is hard to say that there is a
contract that is either fair or efficient to enforce.
84. See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
85. See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
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If A can contract with both of the parties, or if other parties like A
can contract with both of them, then it does not really matter which
contract A chooses, at least in terms of economic considerations. But
we can be sure that contracts with both B and C will proceed only if
we are sure that there are enough parties available to contract with both
of them-that is, if the relevant markets are thick enough. To put it
differently, we can be sure that the contracts will proceed only if capital
markets, credit markets, and other factor markets are all perfect,
because that is the only way to ensure that enough parties will be
available to contract with both B and C In the absence of that
perfection-in other words, in the real world-it may be less socially
efficient for A to pick B (a contract worth $200 in total, but where A
gets 98% of the surplus) over C (a contract worth $250 in total, but
where A gets only 72% of the surplus). That choice would be better
for A, but worse for overall efficiency.
Addressing a few potential complications may be in order at this
stage. For one thing, under typical economic theory, surpluses are not
fixed beforehand; the parties can bargain over them." If the contract
with C is really more valuable (to both parties, together) than the
contract with B, why would Cnot simply offer a better deal to induce
A to make the more efficient contract?" For example, why would A
be able to extract only 72% (or $144) of the contract with B rather than
82% (or $205), which would be enough to entice A to choose Cover B
(because 98% of $200 is only $196, which is less than $205)? Surely
C would prefer getting some surplus rather than no surplus, assuming
Cwere rational and perfectly informed; therefore, Cwould allow A to
extract this greater portion of the surplus.
Bargaining costs, however, may intervene and prevent the
contract with C from going forward. Though it is, of course, correct
that divisions of surpluses are not necessarily fixed in advance of
contract negotiations, they may reflect typical bargaining patterns in
industries, and it may be hard or expensive to vary far from those
patterns."
86. But see Eisenberg, supra note 81, at 392-93 (suggesting that there could be
practical reasons that surpluses are indeed fixed in advance).
87. This is, again, just a restatement of the Coase Theorem. See generally Coase,
supra note 10.
88. Cf Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contact Theory and the Limits ofContract
Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 554 (2003) ("[Wlhen bargaining power is determined prior to
contract formation, as is common in business contexts, . . . [p]arties jointly choose the
contract terms so as to maximize the surplus, which the price may then divide unequally.").
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Perhaps more importantly, in the real world, we cannot be sure
that it will be worthwhile for A to continue to search for alternatives
once finding her privately good deal with B. In other words, the mere
availability of a contract with one party can crowd out better contracts,
because parties do not have unlimited resources to spend searching for
contracting partners and then bargaining over contracts." As long as A
can contract with only one party, and as long as nobody else will be
around to contract with the other party, simply providing the option of
contracting with B makes it less likely, in the real world, that the more
socially profitable contract with C will be concluded. But if the
contract with B is barely socially valuable compared to its alternatives,
it could be a mistake to allow it, particularly where it is so good for A
privately that A may stop searching once she finds it."
Moreover, to emphasize the parties' ability to bargain further here
would again engage in a kind of Coasean bait-and-switch." If
bargaining is perfect, minimum-wage laws and unconscionability
doctrines have no negative effects: if parties can get around
transaction costs in general, then parties can get around a minimum-
wage law by adjusting other terms. The goal of the legal rules at stake
should be to do what makes sense in view of the transaction costs that
we know from experience or empirical research are familiar, and if that
is the starting point, then it becomes difficult to say without more that
minimum-wage laws are inefficient without looking at the potentially
redistributive activity they prevent-that is, activity that is more
redistributive than other alternatives available to the contracting
parties.
The observation that the contract between A and B is, on its own
terms, an efficient contract (because it has a surplus) is, then,
insufficient if the goal is to evaluate the normative instrumental
justifications for a rule about unconscionability. This, however, has not
stopped economists from creating the impression that minimum-wage
89. See Peter A. Diamond & Eric Maskin, An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and
Breach of Contract, P Steady States, 10 BELL J. ECON. 282 (1979); PA. Diamond & Eric
Maskin, An Equilibdium Analysis of Search and Breach of Contract, II A Non-Steady State
Example, 25 J. EcoN. THEORY 165 (1981); George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information,
69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961); Shawn J. Bayem & Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Expectation
Measure andIts Discontents(Mar. 5, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
90. In the more general case, putting aside features specific to contract law,
unconscionability, and minimum-wage laws, there is no reason to believe that parties will
always be able to reach the most efficient result through private bargaining, regardless of the
state of the law. To assume that would be to assume that there are never transaction costs
great enough to prevent one potentially efficient bargain from proceeding.
91. Cf discussion supra Part III.B.3.
170 [Vol. 86:135
FALSE EFFICIENCY
rules, or those preventing unconscionability, are inefficient in broad,
almost incontrovertible terms.92
In other words, it is clear that there can be simple efficiency-
motivated reasons for a substantive-unconscionability doctrine in
contract law. It is incomplete to attack unconscionability doctrines and
minimum-wage laws on the ground that the contract between A and B
should be permitted or encouraged because it makes A and B better
off. The absence of a rule preventing unconscionability encourages A
to choose B (or at least makes it more likely that A will choose B) as a
contracting partner instead of C Because the contract with C could
benefit society more, the increased likelihood of a contract with B
reflects a deadweight social loss.
Note, as before, that if all otherwise efficient transactions could
be completed because factor markets were perfect, then there would be
no inefficiency at stake here from A's opportunism: A could contract
with both B and C Or if A contracted with B, someone else could
contract with C But because factor markets are imperfect (for
example, A cannot get credit to contract with both B and C, and not
everyone can become like A merely because there is some value to his
position), society loses, overall, from A's "unfair" contract with B.
In other words, allowing a factory owner to contract with
disorganized low-wage laborers under harsh conditions might improve
(at least in a narrow sense) the position of both the owner and the
laborers, but it is difficult to know whether, in the abstract, allowing
the contract to proceed is more efficient than its alternatives. Perhaps
it would be more efficient for society if the owner were in a different
business or if the factory were put to a different use-possibilities that
might not even arise without an unconscionability rule or minimum-
wage doctrine, because of the redistributive potential of the particular
92. See Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability A Critical Reappraisal 18 J.L. &
ECON. 293, 306 (1975) ("[T]he problem with substantive unconscionability is further
increased because the clauses so attacked are, at the time of formation, arguably in the
interests of both parties to the agreement."); Mark A. Graber, Does It Really Matter?
Conservative Couts in a Conservative Era, 75 FORDHAM L. REv 675, 685 (2006) ("Most
conservatives oppose minimum wage laws as economically inefficient."); Kent Greenfield,
Reclaimng Corporate Law in a New Gilded Age, 2 HARv. L. & PoL'Y REv. 1, 25 (2008)
("Current public policy tools that redistribute wealth and income tend to either take effect
after the initial distribution of financial wealth (e.g., taxes, welfare policy) or benefit only
those at the lowest rung of the economic ladder (e.g., the minimum wage). These
mechanisms are notoriously inefficient."); Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being, and
Public Choice, 57 U. CI. L. REV. 63, 82 (1990) (noting that "[tihe minimum wage statute is
clearly inefficient under traditional neoclassical criteria for allocative efficiency" but
discussing the possibility that people might draw "social utility" from fairer rules).
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use the factory owner proposes. If a significant motivation of those
who engage in activities that these laws prevent are systematically
redistributing wealth to themselves and away from others, the absence
of these laws encourages more of that activity. That is not necessarily
efficient, even if the activity does produce wealth compared to its
absence, because it may prevent more efficient activity from
occurnng.
2. Constructing Unconscionability in View of Factor-Market
Imperfection
The particular potential inefficiency I have outlined of
uncritically permitting parties to make all contracts they desire to
make, including substantively unconscionable ones, points the way
toward what is perhaps a conceptually clearer view of the
unconscionability doctrine. As it stands, the doctrine is vague and
potentially undertheorized." But the problem I have identified rests on
opportunism and on the suspicion that a party is engaging in excessive
surplus extraction in ways that divert his or her attention away from
more productive activities. Accordingly, an important test in
understanding unconscionability doctrine is whether the allegedly
unconscionable party, without the availability of the unconscionable
transaction, would have engaged in an activity that is more socially
productive than the (admittedly socially productive)94 unconscionable
contract. For instance, in my example, would the factory owner have
chosen some other activity that is more productive for society if the
law-either a judicially enforced doctrine of unconscionability or
something like a statutory minimum-wage or rent-control law-did
not permit the particular fifty cents an hour wage contract that the
factory adopted?
On this view, the focus of analysis for a court considering an
allegedly unconscionable contract is on the state of the allegedly
unconscionable party, not the party that the doctrine would protect."
In other words, based on the potential economic problem I am
identifying, a court considering whether a contract is unconscionable
93. See 1 FARNSWORTH, supm note 83, § 4.28, at 581 ("Nowhere among the [UCC's]
many definitions is there one of unconscionability. That the term is incapable of precise
definition is a source of both strength and weakness. The comments to UCC 2-302 give only
the most general guidance on the meaning of the term." (emphasis omitted)).
94. Again, I make this concession just for the purposes of considering economic
arguments on their own terms.
95. Contra COfER & ULEN, supm note 42, at 290-92.
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should not especially focus on the hardship suffered by the weaker or
poorer party. In some sense, this makes sense purely on grounds of
efficiency-again putting aside concerns of fairness, other moral
considerations, the overall social distribution of wealth, and so on-
because on such grounds both parties are better off if the contract is
permitted than if it is not; the question is not whether the parties suffer
but whether society overall suffers because of the contract's crowding-
out effect on other, potentially more efficient contracts. This requires
that we look to the nature and condition of the allegedly
unconscionable party, the one that threatens to extract a large amount
of the contractual surplus; the danger is that that party's focus on
redistribution rather than social efficiency is leading in fact to social
inefficiency.
This view, though perhaps counterintuitive as a whole, is
consistent with several intuitions that lawyers and law students seem to
have about unconscionability doctrine. For example, Fuller &
Eisenberg's popular casebook Basic Contract Law includes a note that
a report by the Federal Trade Commission96 found, on limited data, that
though retailers in low-income areas charged their customers greater
prices and interest, their profit margins were not significantly greater
than those of mainstream retailers." To the extent this finding is true,
my sense is that it would tend to make people more, rather than less,
accepting of the practices of low-income retailers. That response is
consistent with an intuition that the position of the allegedly
unconscionable party matters. An economic reason for it to matter is
that if the low-income retailers were indeed making supernormal
profits by charging extreme prices, those profits would suggest that
their activities were chosen in lieu of something more socially
efficient: the reason they were low-income retailers, in other words,
was that there was a special opportunity (likely monopolistic or
oligopolistic) to appropriate the money of people with low incomes,
not that there was a commensurately productive opportunity from
society's perspective in the business of low-income retail.
The same line of reasoning applies, of course, to minimum-wage
laws and to rent-control laws. In short, allocative concerns cannot
cleanly be separated from distributive concerns, because the
opportunity to distribute wealth toward oneself affects choices that
96. U.S. FED. TRADE COMM'N, ECONOMIC REPORT ON INSTALLMENT CREDIT AND
RETAIL SALES PRACTICES OF DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RETAILERS (1968).




have allocative consequences. Thus, if landlords are able to receive
supernormal profits by charging high prices to low-income people,
their efforts will be inefficiently concentrated in the low-income-
housing market.
Indeed, this reasoning overall can explain the law's general
distaste for windfalls." A true windfall, if unexpected, may not raise
the problems I am discussing." But those large and apparently unfair
profits that can be sought or invested in lead to exactly the sort of
distortions I have described throughout this Article.
Interestingly, then, we seem to reach a sort of convergence
between long-term efficiency and fairness. Fairness is particularly
concerned with the undeserved appropriation of supernormal profits.
Perhaps intuitions that underlie fairness recognize the economically
distortive effects of such appropriation. Nicely, notions of fairness,
which economists often diminish in private law analysis,'oo seem to
capture intuitions that would address some of the worst potential
efficiency-relatedexcesses of a narrower economic regime.
B. Least-CostAvoiderArguments
A theme that recurs in the law-and-economics literature is the
notion of the least-cost avoider, the party who can take precautions or
insure against an accident at the lowest cost.''
For example, as between an injurer and a victim, we might assign
liability to the party who could have most cheaply avoided the
accident. If the injurer would need to stop her activity entirely to avoid
the accident and the victim can avoid being injured by engaging in a
$2 precaution, the rule would force the victim to bear the costs of the
injury
On the surface, the least-cost avoider principle seems sensible
enough, but it provides a perverse long-term incentive to avoid
becoming the least-cost avoider in order to take advantage,
98. See Christine Hurt, The Windfall Myth, 8 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 339, 341
(2010) ("[I]n court, once a judge classifies an economic gain as a windfall, that gain is then
unlawful and will be prohibited.").
99. See 20 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 378 (James A.H. Murray et al. eds., 2d ed.
1989) (defining "windfall" as a "casual or unexpected acquisition or advantage" (emphasis
added)).
100. CooTER & ULEN, supm note 42, at 7-10.
101. The concept is ordinarily associated with Guido Calabresi. SeeCALABRESI, supra
note 42; Guido Calabresi & Jon T Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Srict Liability in Torts, 81
YALE L.J. 1055, 1060 n.19 (1972); see also Stephen G. Gilles, Negligence, Strict Liability
and the Cheapest Cost-Avoider, 78 VA. L. REv 1291 (1992) (offering a more recent broad
defense of the least-cost avoider principle).
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opportunistically, of the ability to externalize costs under the principle.
The principle might work in theory if courts could evaluate all
motivations over all time periods. Because they cannot, the principle
yields a perverse incentive to engage in activities mostly or solely
because they cause a redistribution of wealth; the activities particularly
encouraged are those that prevent a party from becoming the least-cost
avoider in contexts where the party expects liability to be significant.
Indeed, this problematic incentive seems to be somewhat broader
than the rest of the concerns this Article has raised; that is, it might
apply even if factor markets were perfect.'o2 But the problem is
particularly salient in this Article's context because it encourages a
kind of long-term opportunistic redistribution to which law-and-
economics arguments are characteristically insensitive. To put it
differently, the problem with the least-cost avoider approach is
particularly significant when not all efficient activity can occur,
because there is not just the inefficiency associated with perverse long-
term incentives but the deadweight loss from the absence of the
activities that those incentives crowd out.
In other words, even beyond this Article's context, it would be
problematic for the law to encourage actors to externalize costs by
avoiding becoming the least-cost avoider. (I am tempted to call such
actors least-cost-avoider avoiders.) With factor-market imperfection,
there is a further, second-order result: the activity in which actors
engage to avoid liability under the least-cost avoider rule may prevent
even more efficient activity from occurring.
As an example of an economic argument that suffers from the
problem, one leading understanding of impossibility, impracticability,
frustration, and related contract doctrines comes from Richard Posner
and Andrew Rosenfield.' The basic premise of their argument is the
party who is in a better position either to reduce or to insure against the
risk of unexpected circumstances that develop after a contract is made
should be the one to bear the costs of those unexpected circum-
stances." But a problem with this argument is that it can encourage
parties to put themselves into the position of actors who can only
102. That is, even if factor markets were perfect and thus all activity that is efficient in
isolation can occur, the incentives to avoid becoming the least-cost avoider of injuries could
distort behavior.
103. Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and RelatedDoctrines
m ContactLaw: An Economic Analysis, 6 . LEGAL STuD. 83 (1977).
104. Id. at 88-92.
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reduce or bear the costs of unexpected circumstances at large cost.'o
Factor-market imperfection exacerbates the problem by allowing
whatever that activity is to crowd out more efficient activity.
The least-cost avoider principle arises often in law-and-
economics literature. For example, it has been applied to legal rules
concerning offer and acceptance, and damages for reliance, in contract
law;'" civil-procedural rules concerning sanctions for frivolous
claims;' and even tax law.o' In all those contexts, the potential
problem is the same: favoring one who has high costs encourages
people to avoid being in a situation where their costs are low, even if
having low costs is better for society.
V. CONCLUSION
If factor markets were perfect, arguments that permit
opportunistic redistribution of wealth, like the Hand Formula and the
theory of efficient breach, would have more plausible claims to
efficiency than they do. At the very least, they would be efficient if the
activities that they encourage are "efficient" or "wealth-producing" in
the sense that the activities should occur rather than not occur, because
we would not have to worry about potentially more efficient
alternatives: both the more socially expensive activity and its cheaper
alternative could occur. As noted throughout, when we speak purely in
terms of economic efficiency, we do-all else equal-want an activity
that generates $100,000 in profits by causing $95,000 in harms to a
third party to occur, rather than not to occur. But if factor markets are
imperfect, law and policy may need to choose a more efficient activity
over one that is so minimally productive, relative to its redistributive
potential. What has come to be thought of as "law-and-economics
reasoning" too often encourages more expensive activities over
cheaper ones. For example, it may, through the Hand Formula,
encourage potential injurers to engage in selfish activity that is more
socially harmful than its alternatives would be; it may similarly,
through the theory of efficient breach, directly undermine efficiency
105. Professor Eisenberg has noted, similarly, that Posner and Rosenfield's rule would
discourage parties from attaining "diversification and scale." Melvin A. Eisenberg,
Impossibility Impracticability and Frustration, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 207, 25 3-54 (2009).
106. See Avery Katz, When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory
Estoppel i Preliminary Negotiations, 105 YALE L.J. 1249 (1996).
107. See James E. Ward IV Note, Rule 11 and Factually Frivolous Clains-The Goal
of Cost Mimnizzation and the Clienth Duty To Investigate, 44 VAND. L. RE. 1165 (199 1).
108. See Kyle D. Logue & Joel Slemrod, Of Coase, Calabresi, and Optimal Tax
Liability, 63 TAx L. REv. 797 (2010).
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by encouraging rates of redistributive breach far in excess of those that
are optimal.
Many prominent law-and-economics arguments in subjects like
contract law and tort law become significantly less forceful when
factor-market perfection does not hold; that is, they are less forceful in
the real world than in a world constructed solely from theory. Law-
and-economic analysis tends to focus on one particular good (or set of
goods) at a time-for example, on the costs of precautions and
accidents in tort law. In limiting its focus in this way, traditional legal-
economic analysis promotes rules that, if adopted, would cause many
activities to be mispriced. This mispricing might not matter if capital
and credit markets (and other factor markets) were perfect, for efficient
factor availability would still allow all marginally desirable activities to
proceed. For example, with factor-market perfection and no
transaction costs, it would not matter (from a standpoint of economic
efficiency) whether the law encouraged one wealth-promoting activity
over another, because all such activities would nonetheless occur.109 In
the real world, however, merely knowing that one activity promotes
wealth on its own is not enough for the law to encourage it-even on
purely instrumental, efficiency-oriented grounds. In short, the law
cannot properly make allocatively optimal decisions by focusing on
only a few narrow optimands at once.
This is not, or at least should not be, news to academic
economists."o Economic theory has long understood that a variety of
assumptions are necessary for society to reach "general equilibrium,"
rather than just equilibrium in particular markets."' Economic
analyses in law, such as arguments about activity levels in tort law,112
are even sometimes sensitive to the broad kind of cost-externalization
associated with the problems I am describing, though in ways that I
have argued are incomplete because they still restrict their goals to one
109. This is just an adaptation of the Coase Theorem. See genemly Coase, supra note
10.
110. In that sense, this Article is part of a long tradition of using fundamental
economic points to undermine narrower policy conclusions made by legal-academic scholars.
See Calabresi, supm note 79, at 68-69 ("It may be that [a generalization of the Coase
Theorem that Calabresi offered] has always been quite obvious to economists, although if it
has its relevance has too frequently been ignored. In any event, lawyers who use economics
have in virtually every case been hopelessly confused on the subject."); see also Bayern,
Neglgence, supra note 5, at 719 n.38 (observing that the economist on whose work later legal
reasoning rested "recognized, interestingly, some features of the fragility of his model" that
later legal commentators tended to disregard or at least deemphasize).
111. SAMUELSON&NORDHAUS, supra note 23, at 160-65.
112. See Shavell, supra note 54.
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optimand at once (or at best a handful at once). This recognition,
unfortunately, is routinely ignored in legal-economic scholarship, and
as a result, legal commentary is too trusting of abstract economic
modeling and insufficiently insensitive to the significant negative
potential consequences of activity mispricing, opportunistic behavior,
and similar broad distortions. To frame the problem in simple terms of
transaction costs, the costs associated with the imperfections in capital
markets, credit markets, and other factor markets-imperfections that
should be all too obvious given recent history-need to be emphasized
more for legal-economic arguments to promote truly efficient
outcomes.
In systematically criticizing legal rules based on fairness and
other noneconomic considerations, the law-and-economics movement
has ironically promoted inefficiency. It has also resurrected
conceptualism, or the notion that law can be algorithmically derived
from a series of axioms whose social goals are severely limited. As it
turns out, rules based on considerations other than narrow economic
reasoning are often more likely, rather than less, to promote efficiency,
at least in a world where not all fundamental economic assumptions
can be accepted at face value.
To the extent this is true, the reasoning offered in typical law-and-
economics arguments in the private law fairly obviously cannot be
treated as determinative because the arguments have explicitly
narrowed their scope to a subset of all possibly significant instrumental
goals. This is not a criticism of the entire legal-economic research
agenda, but it is important to realize that it serves as a caveat for
almost all legal-economic conclusions and that those arguments' force
needs to be appropriately limited when considering how they ought to
affect legal policy.
It is important to conclude with a note of modesty and to reiterate
that the fallacy in economic reasoning that I am describing does not
necessarily lead to inefficiency in all cases. My argument has been far
more cautious and more modest than one that would suggest such a
broad conclusion. This Article has observed that a common form of
legal-economic reasoning is, perhaps surprisingly, entirely insufficient
to justify its results. Particular results of the arguments I have
discussed may still be efficient in particular domains; the thesis of this
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Article has been only that they might not be, and that classic economic
arguments provide insufficient reasons to conclude that they are."'
113. Clearly, then, something broader is needed. I am inclined to think that what is
needed is a more direct, less formal analysis of the factual contexts at stake. Cf Mark
Kelman, The Necessary Myth of Objective Causation Judgments h> Liberal Political Theory,
63 Ctiu.-KENT L. REv. 579, 586 (1987) (noting that while "[s]traightforward dialogue about
morally preferred desires and values is needed[J straightforward dialogue about desires and
values is precisely what [classical] liberalism"-and, as it happens, the law-and-economics
movement- "believes impossible").
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